"ETHNIC CONFLICT" UNDRESSED: PATTERNS OF CONTRAST, INTEREST OF ELITES, AND CLIENTELISM OF FOREIGN POWERS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE—BOSNIA, INDIA, PAKISTAN

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Ethnic conflict is not—because there are no ethnic groups in conflict. This is the main conclusion of a comparison of so-called "ethnic conflicts" in the Balkans and in colonial India. A comparison of Muslim nation building in these two regions provides several valuable insights that go far beyond the specific cases. Thus far, there have been many hints in the literature on similarities between Bosnia and Pakistan or the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent as a whole. But there have been no systematic comparisons, though many parallels emerge when we look more closely.

What do the Balkans have in common with India? The wars of secession in the former Yugoslavia and the partition of colonial India into today's India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are half a century apart. The circumstances of the two events seem obviously different; and, above all, the terminology of the two regions differs significantly. In the Balkans, people speak of *Ethnien, éthnies,* or *"ethnic groups"* and consequently *"ethnic conflict."* In India, similar phenomena are labeled *"communities,"* and hence *"communal conflict."*

This confusion is the starting point of the following discussion. I argue that the confusion about "ethnicity" has made the term useless for scientific research. In order to address the phenomenon that many call "ethnic conflict," we must infuse the term with new meaning—a meaning that reflects the confusion and, at the same time, the construction and political effects of "ethnicity."

I will argue that it makes sense to define "ethnic groups" or "communities" as a concept of action with—in our cases—religion as "ethnicenter." The technique is to shape "ethnic groups" first in theory, then in practice, in contrast to religion *ex post facto* with the help of historical myths, language construction, and instrumentalized customs in order to overcome contradictions and cross-cutting cleavages. Only in this way, can the problematic transition from primordial elements to political action and nation building be smoothed. In practice, external actors, like the international

community during the crumbling of Yugoslavia and the colonial British in India, have helped to harden the ethnonational camps and encouraged ethnonational spokespeople to pursue the goal of a "nation state." This is one reason why Muslim nation and homeland building in Bosnia and India/Pakistan largely succeeded though it lacked mass support.

Another argument of this article is that the "ethnic" concept does not live long once the goal of an ethnonational state is reached. It is a more of a dynamic than a consolidating concept, as can be seen in Pakistan in particular but also in Bosnia. Once the ethnonational camps are fenced in by state borders, new cleavages occur within the supposed "ethnic group." Ethnonationalism dies with its own success—the ethnonational state. Consequently, there are no such things as ethnonational states. "Ethnic" state building is an illusion. However, the attempts to further these projects alone bear new sources of conflict.

In the final section I will look at possible ways to break the vicious circle of the "ethnic" paradigm. One observation starts on the mental level. The external actors in the Balkans and in colonial India missed the chance to dismiss the "ethnic paradigm" from the very beginning and thus encouraged ethnonational spokesmen to pursue their political aims step by step, which finally narrowed down the policy options to absurd geographical divisions.

Another lesson is that institutional power-sharing arrangements within a state structure are less effective in preventing "ethnic" tensions than supra-state perspectives and international cooperation that supports non-ethnonational forces. In this way, external powers can withdraw resources from ethnonational activists—an option that has been widely ignored or ill pursued. Supra-state structures gain importance because the "nation state"—the very bone of contention in ethnonationalist struggles—often cannot deliver the platform for conflict resolution by itself.

Confusion about Ethnicity

It is surprising that hardly any scholar dares to apply the term "ethnic group" to India. Once authors start doing it, they find themselves in a whirlpool of different cross-cutting cleavages such as religion, language, customs, caste, and race. James Manor dismantles the confusion: Ethnicity in India means: (1) religion—above all, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs; (2) language—at least nine main tongues and countless others; (3) outcasts and scheduled tribes outside Hindu society; (4) racially distinct tribes, primarily inhabiting the Himalayas and the northeastern mountains; (5) "Arians" and "Dravidians," dividing the subcontinent into north and south along the regional cleavage of the ancient Indo-European and Dravidian languages.[1] In view of such confusion, Manor concludes quite optimistically, "[T]he complexity of Indian society tends to prevent tension and conflict from building along a single fault-line in ways that might threaten national unity and the democratic process."[2]

As Holm Sundhaussen has argued, there are no clear-cut cleavages in the

Balkans either:

> Slovenes and Croats belong to the same (Roman Catholic) confession, however, they differ in their scripts. Croats and Serbs use the same (Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian) script, however, they belong to different confessions. The Bosnian Muslims differ from their contemporaries (Serbs and Croats) in confession only, whereas they differ from other Muslims in Yugoslavia (e.g. from the Albanians) in language and origin. The Macedonians share with the Serbs the same Orthodox confession, however, they possess an own script since the end of World War II. And insofar as the Montenegrenians want to define themselves as a nation, they need in addition to language and faith (which they share with the Serbs) at least a further mark of distinction in order to underpin their autonomy (e.g. different historic traditions and social forms of organization).[3]

In other words, the phenomenon of a so-called "ethnic group," displayed in such complex variety and with such cross-cutting cleavages, is not a suitable concept with which to examine political conflict and nation building, which strive for homogeneity. Max Weber discerned as early as 1921, "For any really exact study [the term 'ethnicity'] is a totally useless collective name."[4] The present scientific debate has not come to grips with this term. There is no widely respected definition, neither in the field of ethnology, nor in those of politics, history, or international law. The same problem exists with the term "nation." This is not the place to engage in an extensive discussion of the competing concepts of ethnicity and nation; however, we need to outline some of the basic positions in this debate.

Primordial or *tribalist* interpretations approach an ethnic group—however it be defined—as an *a priori* social fact, i.e., something that was revealed by science after it had come into existence. Primordial factors like origin, language, religion, skin color, tradition (from clothes to cooking recipes), and belonging to a diffusely (not yet politically) defined land determine human beings by and since birth. Those who share these factors are supposed to be affectively bound to each other. Nobody can escape their ethnic ascription; it is *objective*. Ethnic groups in this sense are rather solid unities. In comparative politics they can thus be used as independent variables that influence political outcomes.[5]

The *situative, constuctivist* or *instrumentalist* approaches place much less emphasis on the common origin of people—sometimes this notion might be dismissed alltogether.[6] In the extreme case, an ethnic group is how it defines itself or as what it is defined by others. Whether people appeal to common characteristics depends on the social, political, or economic situation. It is by no means inevitable.[7] According to need, certain characteristics are emphasized in order to compete with other associations. The ascription is subjective. Anthony Cohen described this phenomenon: "People can think themselves into difference."[8] Ethnic groups in this sense are flexible and are similar to interest groups. They are primarily a product of exterior influences and can therefore be viewed as a dependent variable.

The approach of the sociologist Georg Elwert represents an important exception.

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Although he is of the opinion that ethnicity is a (European) construction, he does not see any space for subjective ascription. He argues that ethnicity has been invented by colonial scientists, who imposed their scheme on indigenous people.[9] Samuel Huntington also views this ascription—which he calls "tribalism"—as a modern product.[10] For most constructivists, the *belief* in community is important, an opinion that both John Stuart Mill and Weber argued long ago.[11] Many scholars today agree with these ideas. Sabrina Ramet defines the term "ethnicity" in relation to the Bosnian Muslims as "a group of people who *believe* that they constitute a primary cultural unit and who *believe* that they have common cultural interests."[12] Paul Brass argues in a similar vein for the Indian case.[13]

Neither the primordialist nor the constructivist approaches provide a satisfying description of the phenomenon of ethnicity. Primordialists determine ethnic groups as fixed. They cannot explain why some ethnic groups decay, new ones appear, and others merge. Neither can they tell us why some characteristics seem more important than others and why some ethnic groups (seemingly as a whole) fight each other and others cooperate. Constructivists tend to neglect the factor of origin. Thus they may not be able to distinguish ethnic groups from other social categories. This approach has difficulties explaining why the masses tend to be mobilized so easily with appeal to origin and culture, and why people are even ready to die without any material rewards.

Therefore, most scholars nowadays support a mixed version of these approaches.[14] Brass, for example, has shifted from a purely instrumentalist view in his earlier works to a mixed approach, which he defines as follows: "[E]lites and counter-élites within ethnic groups *select aspects of the group's culture*, attach *new value and meaning* to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups."[15] Whereas Brass still leans more towards the instrumentalist side, Anthony Smith is an eminent scholar who places more emphasis on the primordial aspect.[16] Most representatives of the mixed approach argue that ethnicity has not existed forever but that it must be invented and formed. During this process, however, "old material" is used selectively. This is particularly clear when past events are interpreted and appropriated selectively and finally sold as "common history."

The situative-primordial approach allows us to treat ethnicity as an independent as well as a dependent variable. The question whether ethnic groups are old or new appears in a new light if one applies societal modernization as an independent variable to ethnicity as a dependent variable. Here, two main strands of argumentation exist, as follows.

In rare harmony, liberals, functionalists, and Marxists alike hold that ethnic groups wear out in the process of modernization.[17] It does not matter whether these groups are viewed as primordial or as artificial realities. Primordialists and constructivists agree on this issue as well.[18]

Pluralists, by contrast, state that ethnicity has not been weakened but strengthened

by modernization. Under these circumstances this principle of social organization could only thrive and evolve as a political factor.[19] This implies that ethnic groups change consistently through modern influences. Consequently, the constructivist view prevails here. As a special case—if not entirely deviating but supplementary—Ernest Gellner argues that nation building as a highly developed form of social organization helps primordial factors (above all language) to gain new importance.[20]

This short summary of common approaches displays how difficult it has become to agree on a single and respected definition of "ethnicity." The matter becomes even more complicated if one adds the factor of ascription as well. Subjective and objective ethnic ascription cuts across the theories and splits them once again. There are unsolvable tensions between the characteristics subjective/objective, dependent/independent variable, and the common classification of primordial/constructivist. Table 1 gives some idea of the ideal types of the different versions.

In addition to this variety of interpretation, there is yet another incongruity: how much is politics part of an ethnic group? This question is far from solved. Smith, for example, links ethnicity to a fixed and clear-cut territory. He defines "ethnic community (or 'éthnie') as a named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories, and elements of common culture with a link to a *specific territory* and a measure of solidarity."[21] Dipankar Gupta goes even further. She links ethnicity to an entitlement of sovereignty.[22] By contrast, Norbert Reiter argues that territory has nothing to do with the ethnic concept itself. Territory gains importance only when other factors in nation building are already in place.[23] Karl W. Deutsch also argues that the idea of territory is a political projection: "No person can be born at more than one spot on the map. The actual place of his birth has the size of a bed or a room, not the size of a country."[24]

TABLE 1
Tensions between different approaches on ethnicity

Approaches (right) which lead to the following conclusions (below)	Ascription: subjective	Ascription: objective	Ethnic group as dependent variable	Ethnic group as independent variable	Ethnic group strengthened or formed by modernization	Ethnic group weakened by modernization
Primordial	−	+	−	+	−**	+
Constructivist	+	−*	+	−	+	−***
Primordial-constructivist	+	+	+	+	+	+

+ = Typical/frequent

− = Untypical/rare

* = *Exception*: Elwert

** = *Exception*: Gellner

*** = *Exception*: Marxists, functionalists, Hobsbawm

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The problem is that the more political entitlements are added to the notion of "ethnicity," the less it can be distinguished from what is called a "nation." Therefore, in order to distinguish an ethnic group it should be viewed as a *pre-political* association of people who settle in a certain land that is not subject to political philosophy. The other extreme, the notion of a "holy land," is, by contrast, a monstrous product of a rather advanced stage of political nation building.

The confusion about the term "ethnicity" has become so severe that the term has ceased to be useful for scientific research. In addition, the variety of case studies makes the concept of ethnicity useless. If one subscribes to a broad definition, it is too porous to have much explanatory power. If one narrows the definition in order to avoid contradictions, the description will serve for a single case only and will lose explanatory power. Above all, a pre-political definition—as it should be for the sake of clarity—obstructs the way to a seamless transition towards the process of so-called "nation building," which is primarily a political endeavor. It is clear that by, say, family bonds in the real sense, it is difficult to build nations with a clear political ambition, a notion of a wider territory, and an increasing degree of political mobilization.

We face a dilemma. On the one hand, ethnic characteristics in their traditional sense can function only at the cost of their deformation. On the other hand, the whole world speaks of "ethnic conflicts." How can this add up?

Political protagonists who refer to "ethnic conflicts" do not refer to the diffuse expressions of various primordial factors. They claim that ethnic groups as a clear-cut and solid whole fight each other. Of course, this is incorrect in connection with the Balkans, India, or anywhere else. But because the term "ethnic group" is used by the protagonists of "ethnic conflicts," it makes sense to stick to the term no matter how bad it is. Otherwise, scholars will drift aloof of political reality. The task of scholars must be to provide the term with a different meaning and to expose the protagonists' eyewash. The case studies of Bosnia and India can help us to find a new definition.

Patterns of Contrast

The new term of "ethnic group," in quotation marks only, is systematic rather than historic. It is a *concept of action,* based on the definition that *one* primordial characteristic is singled out as the main point of contrast to another group that is similarly constructed.[25] This concept is too weak, however, to mobilize the people who share this characteristic with respect to "the other." As mentioned above, cross-cutting divisions prevent the formation of a strong group feeling with political potential. In order to mobilize the people, other primordial components are added around the central element. These secondary characteristics are bent accordingly, over-emphasized, or constructed.

This concentric concept of "ethnicity" has an epicentre around which other

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contrasts are created by means of subsequent and additional attributes. Determining such an "ethnicentre" is a pre-selection for a unilateral adjustment of the group, which serves as its indispensable self-definition. By this only, a political constituency can be created—and this is necessary for the project of "ethnic nation building."

In the Balkans and in India's communal struggle the primary characteristic is religion, which political activists adopt to contrast the "opposing camps." This is why churches and religious leaders play such an important role.[26] Those who believed in Islam were defined—against many contradictions—as an "ethnic group" in contrast to other "ethnic groups" like Catholics, Orthodox, and Hindus.

The newly defined term of "ethnicity" solves the problem of diverging terminology in the Bosnian and Indian cases. An "ethnic group" thus defined is the same as a "community" in the Indian context.[27] The statements of Sundhaussen on the Balkan case and Manor on India show that ethnic groups—without quotation marks—are fuzzy and difficult to determine. A Muslim Bosnian shares many characteristics with his Orthodox and Catholic Bosnian neighbors, including dialect. Likewise, an Indian Hindu from Punjab has more in common (language, customs, etc.) with his Muslim and Sikh neighbors than with his fellow believers in Tamil Nadu. In Pakistan, ethnic sentiments (e.g., of region or language) run counter to the "ethnic" notion of a Muslim homeland.

Although the concept of "ethnicity"—with quotation marks—is flexible and strategic, it does not dismiss primordial resources that other social categories, such as interest groups, cannot offer. This is because it appeals to resources that are present *a priori* and in person. They do not have to be painstakingly put together by political discourse and consensus building. A long process of opinion making is not necessary. This explains why the "ethnic" paradigm helps to create a mobilizing advantage in times of a poor and limited democratic discourse, such as during the first free elections in post-communist Yugoslavia, or under the colonial hub in India. Primordial characteristics are hooks at which political projects can easily dock.

The Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, must have had this phenomenon in mind when he said, "When you call for a public debate on democracy, a few hundred intellectuals will come. When it's about nationalism, you will get tens of thousands of all social layers into the streets."[28]

Telegram of Terminology

The terminology can be described as a logic, an interlaced chain that includes the following basic concepts.

Ethnic Group

A group of people whose descent can be considered "common" in relation to its societal value. Customs, language, religion, etc. are additional group features. The

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primordial elements are diffuse and exist in different expressions. They do not have to occur all at once. The borders around ethnic groups are tendentially fluid. Cross-cutting cleavages and syncretisms are possible. Each ethnic group is unique in its historic setting.

Religion + x = "Ethnic Group"

x can be: language, history, symbols, customs, etc. These secondary features are all added, overvalued, or constructed *ex post* in order to strengthen the primary feature of religion (ethnicentre) against the opposing group, which is constructed in the same way. "Ethnic group" is a situative concept of contrast. It is not individually and historically embedded. The borders of "ethnic groups" are tendentially sharp and impermeable. In other cases, the formula can be: language + x = "ethnic group", or other combinations.

"Ethnic Group" + x = Ethnonation/Community

x represents political, social, and economic ambitions, striving for self-determination and possibly a state whose borders are supposed to overlap the land settled by the "ethnic group." x contains political dynamics and a degree of organization. The "ethnonation" is, at the same time, the presumed group to which ethnonationalists appeal. They appear as a political action group. As spokespeople of the "ethnic group" they mobilize their resources (which are: religion + x) and achieve *political* results. It is not necessary, and even impossible, that all members of the "ethnic group" are mobilized. There is always a discrepancy between those who share the group features and those who act in their name. The term "ethnic conflict" therefore must be correctly called "ethnonational conflict."

Nation

This can be either an ethnonation or civic-democratic nation as exemplified in the German and French nation concepts (objective or subjective assignment of "ethnic" features).

Ethnonationalism/Communalism

This signifies the ideology and political phenomenon on an ethnonational basis.

"Nation State"

This is a state according to the construction plan of the ethnonational or civic-democratic nation concept. However, this concept is mostly used to mean the final success

and almost unreachable ideal of a state in the ethnonational paradigm. The correct term should be "ethnonational state." The shorter term "nation state" is still applied by ethnonational activists and many others.

An analysis of the term "nationalism" displays how important a clear-cut terminology is. Table 2 presents the content and function of nationalism in the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent.

In the Balkans and India spokesmen for "ethnic groups" have engaged in a race to strengthen religion with other primordial elements in order to avoid appropriation by "the others." The following section will analyze the components of ethnonationalism in Bosnia, India, and Pakistan.

The Construction of the "Ethnic" Idea

History

In the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent, myths have been created to establish the notion that a group of people who share the same belief is not only a religious community but more importantly an "ethnic" one. The hijacking of history serves to create a "common descent" for those with the same faith.

For this purpose, spokesmen of the Bosnian Muslims propagate the Bogumil myth whenever they intend to contrast themselves to the more advanced nation-bulding projects of Serbia and Croatia.[29] This myth states that today's Bosnian Muslims derive their descent directly from the medieval Bosnian nobility. Allegedly this had already established its own identity through the Bogomil church, which resisted Orthodox and Catholic appropriations. According to the myth, after the Ottoman conquest in 1463 and 1482, the Bosnian and Hercegovinian nobles readily converted to Islam. With them, the mostly Bogumil Bosnian peasants converted *en masse* and became the social pillars of Ottoman rule. In this view, the "ethnicity" of Muslims in

TABLE 2
The Dual Character of Nationalism: Ideal Types

Nationalism according to function (right) and content (below)	Emancipatory	Integral
Civic-democratic (in India: nationalism)	Indian independence movement	– (Nehru/Gandhi)
Ethno-national (in India: communalism)	Pakistan-movement (Jinnah)	Balkan nationalisms*, today's Pakistani and Hindu-nationalisms

*Above all, after the Second World War. Earlier Balkan nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Monarchy also had some emancipatory traits, if no particular aims of reform or modernization.

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Bosnia is older than their religion.

It is no coincidence, that the Bogumil myth receives fresh impetus whenever the *Zeitgeist* suggests upgrading the Bosnian Muslims as an ethnonation—against the ethnonational competitors who label "the Muslims" as Serbs, Croats, or Turks. This first occurred in the Austrian-Hungarian period (primarily since 1900) and in Tito's Yugoslavia (especially since the 1960s). The communist Yugoslav and Muslim historian Atif Purivata propagated this version in his early writings in order to underscore the notion that the Bogumils represented "the nucleus of Muslim nation-building."[30] In 1968, he raised his voice at a time when the Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia were granted the suffix "in the national sense," which was followed in 1971 with their status as a "nation" being written into the constitution. Purivata was convinced that "the overall socio-economic and particularly the cultural and political development of Moslems has affirmed them as a separate ethnic identity."[31] His thesis that today's Muslims derive directly from the Bogumil nobility replaces the Islamic faith as the only criterion of identity.[32] This is why, according to Purivata, the Muslims have to be strictly contrasted with the Turks, with whom they share religion only.[33]

The Bogumil myth has been convincingly refuted by recent research.[34] According to new findings, the Bogumil church as well as the Bosnian state was in decay before the Ottoman invasion.[35] Bosnian nobles were of various origins such as local nobles, men who as boys had been converted by force after being taken away from their parents, public servants from Asia Minor, and immigrants from Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Serbia.[36] Members of all religions converted to Islam and conversions took place step by step rather than *en masse.*[37]

Notably, people of all faiths converted to Islam, not only the "Bogumils." Lately, even Purivata has softened his stand on this issue. In June 2000, he acknowledged the research by Srecko Dzaja and Smail Balic. Today, he said, no scholar supports the Bogumil thesis in its pure version. Purivata suggested as compromise that "we could say: *Most* Bogumils accepted Islam. ... Also Orthodox and Croats did."[38]

Some scholars even doubt whether the Bosnian church was Bogumil at all. It was the Croatian historian Franjo Racki who spoke of the Bogumils in articles stemming from 1869 to 1870.[39] The Bosnians themselves maintained that they were simply *Krstjani* (Christians).[40] Whether or not the Bosnians were Bogumils or something else does not change the argument. Much more interesting from today's point of view is the fact that Racki's theory had two contemporary rivals. One was represented by the Serb writer Petranovic, who claimed that the Bosnian church was, in fact, an apostate Serbian Orthodox one. On the other side, Catholic writers were convinced that the Bosnian church was a branch of the Catholic one.[41] It is clear what this means in the context of a religion-based nation building: the Bosnian Muslims are supposed to be "actual" Serbs or Croats.

In India, similar myths try to attach "ethnicity" to religion by distorting history. Hindu ethnonationalists claim that the Brahmans descend from the Aryan tribe that

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allegedly migrated from central Asia to northern India around 1500 BC and conquered the high civilizations of the Indus valley.[42] This is intended to make every non-Hindu an "ethnically" or even racially distinct person. It is clear, however, that almost all Muslims in India are descended from converted local Hindus. Some scholars doubt whether the Aryans conquered the Indus civilizations at all.[43] Some Hindu nationalists argue just the opposite in order to arrive at the same goal. They negate the Aryan migration theory, thereby intending to revalorize Hinduism. In their view, Hinduism cannot have been "imported" to India like the Muslims or the British. It is native to Indian soil and the basis of all Indianness.[44]

The Muslim side uses myths as well to distinguish themselves "ethnically." Pakistani ideologues try to explain the foundation of the proclaimed Muslim home-land as a logical consequence of history. Various official history books localize the roots of Pakistan in the stone age, in the civilizations of Moenjodaro and Harappa, in the time of the birth of Islam on the Arabian peninsula, or in the invasion of the first Muslim soldiers into Sind in the eighth century.[45] Pakistan's founder and first prime minister, Mohamed Ali Jinnah, made frequent use of such myths: "Pakistan has been there for centuries, it is there today, and it will remain till the end of the world. It was taken away from us; we have only to take it back."[46]

Today, it is the nuclear warheads of India and Pakistan that speak the language of distorted history. The Pakistani missiles are called "Ghauri," which was the name of a Muslim conqueror who in the thirteenth century defeated the Hindu Prithvi Raj Chauhan and for the first time established "Muslim rule" on the subcontinent. Following the same logic, the Indian missile is named "Prithvi."[47] It seems that "the Muslims" and "the Hindus" face each other in age-old hostility, just like their ancient rulers once did. The nuclear research centre near Islamabad has the shape of a mosque. The fundamentalist Hindu organization Visha Hindu Parishad (VHP), which is close to the ruling Hindu nationalist party (BJP), announced it would build a temple on the test area in Rajasthan.[48] Thus, the idea is nurtured that a "Hindu bomb" faces a "Muslim bomb".

Viewing history through a rear-view mirror—in suitable sections—is an effective means to create a common identity and an instrumentalized self-image.[49] In the words of K. N. Panikkar, the imagined past is subject to selective appropriation in favor of new aims.[50] The rear-view mirror is adjusted accordingly. In the Indian case, "The Hindu tends to glorify in retrospect the Vedic age or the Gupta period of Indian History, the Muslim is brought up to consider the medieval period of Muslim dominance as the golden age."[51] In the same vein, Serbian and Croatian writers describe the time of the Ottoman Empire as the "dark age," whereas some Muslim historians tend to glorify it. The function of myths is to homogenize the constituency.

Language

The standardization of languages follows the same purpose. The Balkans and

India/Pakistan are the only examples where language has been shaped *ex post* to overlap with the ethnicentre of religion. The idea behind "ethnicizing" languages is that people who think differently are supposed to speak differently as well. Language becomes more than an instrument of communication, it becomes an ethnonational feature, loaded with historic, political, and cultural connotations. At the end of this process, the ideal is a "national language" in an ethnonational state.

Just because language becomes a *political* problem, linguistics does not matter much. In the case studies, all the ethnonational languages are so-called *Ausbausprachen*—languages consciously shaped and standardized by cultural and political motives and not by grammar.[52] The German romantic philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder and his idea that "languages make nations" had a great impact on intellectuals in the Balkans and in colonial India.[53]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a real chance existed to arrive at a common standard language in the Balkans. The Serb linguist Vuk Karadzic had picked an east Hercegovinian subdialect (Ijekavian-Stokavian) as the "purest" Serbian, which he intended to standardize.[54] At the same time, the pan-Slavic Illyrian intellectuals of Croatia opted for the Stokavian dialect as well. Ideological antagonisms, however, destroyed this illusory harmony. The Croatian spokesmen did not want to be called "actual Serbs," as Karadzic considered anyone who spoke his selected dialect. Neither did the Serb spokesmen like to be appropriated by Illyrian ideas. They suspected that the Catholic church was using pan-Slavism to convert the lost children in the east. Hence, the Serbo-Croatian respectively Croato-Serbian language—or whatever it be called—was split into "Serbian" with Cyrillic script and "Croatian" with Latin script.

Ironically, Karadzic's version did *not* prevail with the Serbs (who continued to speak Ekavian-Stokavian) but with the Croats. It is mostly the Muslims (and Serbs and Croats) in Bosnia-Hercegovina who speak Karadzic's favored Ijekavian.[55] After the collapse of Yugoslavia, language has again gained importance. Bosnian Muslims are once more in the middle of the contrasting extremes. Croatian nationalists appropriate them as "actual Croatians" because they speak their dialect. Serb nationalists see them as "actual Serbs" because they speak Karadzic's "pure Serbian." Nationalist Muslims, for their part, have tried to enrich "their Bosnian" language with Turkish and Persian elements for contrast.[56]

The Indian case follows the same pattern. Hindi, Urdu, and Hindi-Urdu belong to the eastern branch of the Indo-Germanic language family. Brahmans standardized the idiom as classical Sanskrit in the fourth century BC. Since that time, Persian and Arabic influences have also entered the language.[57] The British formally separated the languages by promoting literature in academic purity: Hindi free of Persian, Urdu with as much Persian as possible. This was a purely academic issue among poets and writers. Only the British influence and print technology delivered a new platform to this controversy.[58] At the end of the ninteenth century, ethnonational spokesmen of both sides abused the linguistic variants for political purposes. They contributed to

identifying Hindi with Hindu and Urdu with Muslim.[59] The colonial British supported this development, since they considered Hindus and Muslims to be two different nations and even races.

Ironically, there are many grammatically different languages and countless dialects in the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, the ethnonational protagonists used variants of the same language in order to carve out their ethnonational idioms. This is because the hotbed of Muslim and Hindu ethnonationalism is located in the northern United Provinces (today's Uttar Pradesh), where Hindi-Urdu is prevalent.

Next to religion, Urdu played an important role for the identification of the young Pakistani "nation state" when it was proclaimed. In a 1951 census, however, only 7.2% of Pakistanis declared Urdu to be their mother tongue. More than 54% spoke Bengali.[60] This turned out to be a big problem. Bengalis in East Pakistan considered themselves to be at a disadvantage in the process of job recruitment to the state service. Although Bengali was finally declared the second official language, the tensions continued to build up until, in 1971, East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh. The dream of a Muslim homeland was shaken to its foundations. More Urdu speakers had stayed in India after partition anyway.

Customs

Another example of how contrasts are shaped is the reinterpretation and reinforcing of customs. In the nineteenth century in Bosnia and India, religion and custom grew increasingly closer. At least, this was the officially proclaimed idea, which, however, was not always practiced.

As a rule, conversions to Islam in Bosnia and India had been gradual. Missionary activities and forced conversions were rare.[61] Old customs changed slowly despite a change of faith. In turn, religion did not create a new ethnicity in the traditional sense. Mutual acceptance of different customs was common in both cases. To what extent syncretisms could be observed in Bosnia is not entirely clear.[62] In India it is more obvious. Ex-Hindu Muslims still visited temples, avoided beef, and sometimes shunned certain places if they had previously been Hindu "untouchables."[63] Some of today's Muslims have even stronger Hindu traits than Hindus themselves because they converted as part of a tribe or in a region in which old customs were kept to a greater extent.[64] Although these phenomena were most prevalent in the Middle Ages, they still exist today.

Cultural cleavages in Bosnia and India have been as cross-cutting as the linguistic ones described above. It was again *political* activists who sharpened the contrasts of customs. Conversions became political matters. Changing one's faith became equal to treason. It meant deserting one's "ethnic group." Believers became valuable assets for political spokesmen because they were their inalienable constituency within the "ethnic" paradigm. For example, in Bosnia, an alledged conversion of a Muslim girl mobilized Bosnian Muslim resistance movements against the Habsburg administra-

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tion.[65] Minor conflicts were blown into epic proportions.

In India, conflict over the status of cows provides the best example of such developments. Hindus adored cattle. Muslims ate them. This had never been a problem until 1887, when some Hindus founded the "Cow Protection Society" (*Gorakshini Sabha*). They burned down slaughterhouses and bought cows from Muslims. These actions were, in part, a consequence of a homogenization and standardization of Hindu culture—a development that is also known as the "Hindu Renaissance." It started in the mid-nineteenth century under Man Mohan Roy with great support from the British colonizers.[66]

Technical progress and modern communication facilities promoted the spread of the cow protests. They also helped to bring these kinds of conflicts to the hinterland for the first time. In addition, they bridged the gap of interests between Hindu landowners and Hindu peasants and developed patterns of mobilization. Some Muslims countered by slaughtering cows publicly in marketplaces. As well-aimed agitation increased, the cow issue soon became a purely communal problem. It was only through a grotesque Hindu–Muslim alliance on the highest level that the conflict over how to treat cows was somewhat eased. The so-called Khilafat movement originated from Muslim disdain for the Turkish revolutionary Kemal Atatürk, who abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.[67] M. K. Gandhi recognized a chance to reconcile Indian Muslims and Hindus by mobilizing the Hindus for the Muslim cause, and, in turn, mobilizing the Muslims for his non-cooperation movement against the British. Surprisingly, this worked to a certain extent. Above all, Muslims promised not to slaughter cows in public any more, and Hindus promised not to persecute Muslims for slaughtering cows.

This shows how volatile and manipulable the issue of customs was at that time. Customs and symbols were used to strengthen the religious contrast—and thus to create a constituency—for political reasons. This helped paving the way to an "ethnic" notion of the nation.

Violence

The final means to strengthen contrasts between ethnonational groups is pure violence. In the advanced stages of ethnonational conflict, the inevitable, objective ascription of "ethnicity" could mean life or death to anyone. Professional criminals, so called "riot specialists," entered the villages and stirred trouble along the proclaimed ethnic lines.[68] The strategies of these criminals were remarkably similar in Bosnia in the 1990s and in India before partition.[69] People who had previous lived peacefully together no longer did so. In both cases, women in particular were victims. According to the ethnonational ideology, women reproduce the political value of the "right" person. Rapes by the "ethnic" enemy prevent them from doing so and, in addition, desecrate the high religious and societal status of the female victims. In both Bosnia and India, such violence was part of a systematic war strategy. The

rioters suggested that the different "ethnic groups" could not live together—and they had success in delivering this message to the outside world.

External Powers and Clientelism

Bosnia and India have long been under "alien" rule—a rule of a group or structure (such as Yugoslavia) that is not an ethnonational competitior. In both cases, the rulers exercised great influence in shaping or avoiding ethnonational camps. They constituted the platform to which ethnonationalist leaders had to refer and on which political struggles were fought.

The Habsburg rulers, the international community during the Bosnian war, and the British in India began from the "ethnic" paradigm as described above. They considered Serbs/Croats/Muslims in Bosnia and Muslims/Hindus in India as different, irreconcilable "ethnic groups" or even races and acted accordingly. In both cases, they played them out against each other for their own purposes.[70] This was often compounded by ignorance stemming from a historiography written within the "ethnic" paradigm (communal history).

The views of the external actors strikingly resemble each other. In 1993, the U.S. Foreign Secretary Warren Christopher stated with regard to Yugoslavia: "This is a country in which at least three religions and half a dozen ethnic groups have fought with each other for centuries."[71] Correspondingly, the Joint Committee of Indian Constitutional Reform in 1934 argued that "we are confronted with the age-old antagonism of Hindu and Muhammadan, representatives not only of two religions but of two civilizations."[72] Both views have clearly internalized the "ethnic" paradigm with religion as ethnicentre. This ideology did not leave much space for liberal pluralist approaches towards solving the conflicts. This again provided grist for the mills of ethnonationalists.

The conscious or unconscious internalization and promotion of the "ethnic" paradigm left its traces in political practice from an early stage. The Habsburgs and British founded cultural institutes along supposed "ethnic" lines, promoted "ethnically" diverging languages, and created a party system that was prone to translate their assumptions into politics. This meant an ethnonational quota system and separate electorates in India. The quota system in Yugoslavia's political system was established to guarantee proportional representation along "ethnic" lines. The Communist Party was split up among the ethnonational subrepublics. Career chances were dependent on "ethnic" origin. Political and societal conflicts were solved along "ethnic" lines as well.[73] Laslo Sekelj concludes, "The gradual emergence of a plurality of power centres since the 1960s was not an aspect of political but of *national pluralism*."[74]

Thus cross-cutting cleavages in the form of multi- or trans-"ethnic" parties found no support within the political systems of colonial India and Yugoslavia. This left heavy traces after their collapse. In addition, the population census served a political

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purpose and helped categorize—but often refused—societal realities.

Under these circumstances, the different groups could not form a common political will. At the same time, however, with the disintegration of old structures, a power struggle took place among the elites, and economic competition became more widespread. Yugoslavia and colonial India did not disintegrate because the ethnonational groups were incompatible, but because their elites could not find any power-sharing arrangements.

In the time shortly before break-up, the foreign powers once again fell prey to ethnonational ideology. For example, they offered more support for the ethnonational spokesmen than members of the proclaimed ethnonation did. Hence, Jinnah emerged as the spokesman of "all Muslims" in India, though he led only one Muslim party out of many, and, for a long time, gathered only a tiny fraction of "Muslim votes." Radovan Karadzic was courted as the "Serb leader" at international conferences, though he lacked the support of the majority of Bosnian Serbs, let alone Serbs all over the Balkans.[75] He was nothing more than a self-proclaimed president of a fancy "Serb Republic" who ruled from the capital village of Pale (only Richard Holbrooke refused to shake hands with him and ignored him completely while negotiating with Slobodan Milosevic in 1995). Alija Izetbegovic was considered the main representative of "the Muslim" side, though many Serbs and other groups chose to live in "the Muslim" territory.

The Bosnian Social Democrat Sejfudin Tokic complained accordingly that the international community granted more legitimacy to the ethnonational leaders than the latter actually possessed in Bosnian society. He was convinced that the ethnonational parties would have suffered an electoral setback after the consequence of their policies had been revealed as a bloody war.[76] Of course, Tokic's view as a "multiethnic" politician is self-interested. But, indeed, already in April 1992 (at the beginning of the war) many protesters gathered in front of the parliament in Sarajevo, denounced the ethnonational leaders, and demanded new elections.[77]

It is true that in Bosnia in 1990 and in India in 1946 the ethnonationalist forces experienced an electoral breakthrough. However, when events are placed within their historical context, these results appear less impressive. This is not the place to elaborate on the various doubts scholars have raised; however, a few of these points should be mentioned.[78] Although many of the arguments are valid for the Indian case as well, I will focus on Bosnia.

Free elections came at a time when the multi- and supra-"ethnic" forces were discredited and linked to the failed old system. The Yugoslav tradition of finding *national* rather than *political* solutions was combined with bad timing and fear of the future. Political discussions could not take place properly. Ethnonationalists, who were the first to enter the democratic stage, seemed to offer an easy and attractive alternative. Therefore, "the banner of liberalism in Yugoslavia bred conservative nationalists instead of liberal democrats."[79]

The chronology is important. The people who voted for the ethnonationalist parties

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did not necessarily share the latter's still muddled ideological aims, and they agreed to an even lesser extent with the aims of the parties to destroy Bosnia and to carve out three ethnonational states. One must remember that the different ethnonational parties first joined a broad coalition against the socialists and reformers in parliament before they became enemies on the battlefield. The elections provided no more than a momentary picture. The voters did not anticipate the later developments. At any rate, there was no mass movement for new "nation states."

The politics of the foreign powers now enters this confusion. Since they had internalized the "ethnic" paradigm, they indirectly and directly contributed to legitimizing and encouraging ethnonationalist spokesmen. Of course, this does not mean that the war in Bosnia (or the bloody partition of India) should be blamed entirely on the illwill or incompetence of external actors.[80]

One major mistake that the West committed was its quick diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (a movement that was spearheaded by Germany), primarily because this violated international law, and the Western leaders did not insist on the guarantee of minority rights in the young states as the Badinter Commission suggested.[81] This decision, which was mainly dictated by ideology, triggered a chain reaction that completely overtaxed the international community. The complete lack of perceptiveness brings to mind the picture of a child that plays with matches and is then stunned when the house is suddenly on fire.

Many more shortcomings of the external actors soon became evident. There was not much of a European foreign policy, but instead a repetition of earlier history: Great Britain, France, Russia, and Greece were inclined to listen to the Serb radicals. Germany sided with the Croatian nationalists. The French president François Mitterand in 1992 frankly admitted that it was only natural that each former great European power should feel the commitment to support its former ally in the Balkans.[82] Stefan Troebst has even noted a particular policy pattern among Balkan ethnonational movements, which, since Ottoman times, have tried to win the European and the American public for their cause—often with success.[83]

Even the Norvegian U.N. negotiator Thorvald Stoltenberg provided grist for the mill of Serb ethnonationalists, thereby endangering the moderating role of the U.N. In an interview on 31 May 1995 he stated, "An ethnic war? I don't think one could say so. They are altogether Serbs. The Serbs call themselves like this, too, and nothing is to be added here. In addition, there are the Muslims. They are Serbs anyway who converted to Islam. And pretty many of those who dress like and present themselves as Croats are Serbs, too."[84]

Every step to solve the conflict confirmed that the involved participants were acting within the ethnonational paradigm. The first major talks on Bosnia in February 1992 in Lisbon, which were sponsered by the European Union, ended in a proposal that "was in fact an ethnic map of Bosnia."[85] This proposal constituted a step in the wrong direction. Each new attempt to solve the conflict, such as the Vance–Owen plan or the Stoltenberg proposal, ended in even more tangled situations, which in the

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end made any hopes for a pluralist society and a centralized Bosnian state obsolete. This ended with the Dayton agreement, which left Bosnia split into ethnonational units with a fragile, paralyzed, and confusing state structure.[86]

In principle and increasingly as time passed, the external actors accepted the territorial claims of the ethnonational spokesmen for "their" respective "ethnic group." Once caught in the vicious circle of this paradigm, solutions were sought through haggling about borders and territorial percentage points, about corridors, bridges, and tunnels, so that the hostile "ethnic groups" would not face the risk of running into each other. "Ethnic" expulsions and millions of refugees were another consequence of these failed policies. The current insistence of the international community that refugees be allowed to return to their former homes is noble and important but it looks like a helpless attempt to undo what prior weaknesses and misconceptions have caused.

In allusion to the catchword of British politics in India, Kumar describes the policy of the international actors during the Bosnian war as "divide and quit."[87] In turn, and most tellingly, the British called their plan to split up India into supposedly "ethnic" units the "Balkan Plan;"[88] now some Bosnians speak of a "Pakistanization" of Bosnia, which itself is disintegrating into ever smaller units.[89]

The Easy Success of the Ethnonationalists

The influence of foreign actors provides an answer to the question: Why did ethnonational state building succeed, even if far from all of the nation's members supported this project (as in India and Bosnia) and even though the ethnonational protagonists themselves did not fully back the project (as in Bosnia).[90] These projects succeeded without Miroslav Hroch's conditions being fulfilled—the three stages of nation building as a gradual mass-mobilizing force.[91]

The external forces were a catalyst for the success of ethnonational actors in the internal power struggle. Only a few scholars have incorporated the external aspect in their definition of nation building. One notable exception is Rupert Emerson, who has stated that "The case of Pakistan came close to sustaining the theory that a nation is whatever can get away with establishing its claim to being one."[92] This statement is important because it stresses both of the factors that are in dialectic relation. First of all, interests have to be articulated actively and effectively (no matter on what they are founded), and secondly, external authorities must accept these claims in some form or another. One who "gets away" with something has to manage to "get through" somewhere. Max Weber also had both of these factors in mind. According to him, the term "nation" means that it *imposes* on certain groups of people a specific notion of solidarity vis à vis others."[93]

Many authors ignore the external or "passive" aspect. Hugh Seton-Watson, for example, labels something a "nation," if "a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one."[94]

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Gellner is another who merely considers the "active" internal aspect. Recognition takes part only among the members themselves: "Two men are of the same nation if and only if they *recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation."[95]

However, if we consider the nation building in the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent, the internal aspect does not suffice to explain the political outcomes. Claims have to be heard in the world. If they are ignored, they often perish. If they are furthered, they sometimes reach goals that even their own adherents have not held possible, as happened in our case studies. Founding a state is not an easy venture, but full of obstacles, enemies, and risks—it is often the last resort of a political escalation.[96] But to the British in India and the international community in regard to Bosnia, ethnonational states somehow made sense because the external actors themselves thought within the "ethnic" paradigm. In the Yugoslav case, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the rise of ethnonationalism in Eastern Europe, and German unification underscored the trend of "one nation—one state" even at the end of the twentieth century.

Significantly, in common use today, the notion of a "nation state" clearly has become loaded with ethnonational connotations. The so-called French version of a political, legal, and civic nation has lost practical influence. This is especially obvious in the developments in India and Bosnia. Only Nehru's and Gandhi's Congress Party fought for a political and secular Indian nation state, and they ended up losing to ethnonational concepts, stemming from the British and some of the Muslims.

Hence, the ideological background was favorable for the ethnonational spokesmen. In the same sense, Eric Hobsbawm offers the criticism that "the states of the European Union at the beginning of the 1990s were involved equally in the destruction of Yugoslavia as Tito's heirs themselves."[97]

A more general context lured the ethnonational elites to enhance their efforts for independence: political and economic resources are rich when the aim is reached because world politics works under the presumption that states are the dominant actors in international relations, states have the monopoly of power, and conflicts and interventions are fought and settled at an interstate level.[98]

Hence, Mayall und Simpson conclude that "The state is often a valued prize in the competition between opposing ethnic and/or religious groups. The winners gain monopoly access to the outside world and the ability, therefore, to extract a rent from foreign governments, or private investors, during the process of modernization. ... In other words, both the heterogeneous nature of post-colonial society and the international environment provide a fertile soil in which separatism and secession can propagate and flourish."[99]

Thinking in these categories, the former German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher tried to solve the Yugoslavian conflict by uplifting the conflicting parties to the status of subjects of international law, i.e., states. But after the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, no further step followed to solve the subsequent problems.

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Instead, they escalated in a new constellation with enhanced encouragement and military power. The policy makers should have learned their lesson from India and Pakistan: with the founding of a so-called Muslim "nation state," the quarrels between the proclaimed ethnonational camps have not disappeared. On the contrary, the conflict has heated up with new issues over disputed territory, and new resources such as national armies and atomic bombs.

Therefore, modern scholars of international law have criticized the concept of sovereignty as outdated, dangerous, superfluous, diffuse, and normatively over-loaded.[100] The catastrophe in the Balkans in the 1990s provided an impulse to distance oneself from the classical notion of self-determination. In order to guarantee *human* rights in contrast to *national* rights, and in order to put a buffer between democratic self-determination and state building, the concept of "internal" self-determination has emerged. This means that states should be organized in a way that willing minorities can determine their political fate within the existing state, which would make obsolete the concept of "external" or "offensive" self-determination, i.e., the founding of an ethnonational state. In other words, a particular form of internal state organization becomes the precondition of its international recognition.[101]

This argument also served to justify the military intervention in Serbia during the Kosovo conflict in 1999.[102] In this case, the lessons learned from the Yugoslavian disaster, in which Croatia could declare itself independent with the backing of the European Union without guaranteeing minority rights to its Serbian citizens, were applied. In turn, the Kosovo intervention sent a clear message to the Albanian minority that "We will assist you even with military means, but we will not promise you your own state!" This precondition is a valuable insight that could have prevented the explosive chain reaction that destroyed the Yugoslavian concept of a *political* and *civic* state, which some forces such as the former socialists still defended.

In Bosnia and colonial India, the plans for separation along "ethnic" lines made it difficult for alternative forces to gain a political profile. In both both cases what Rudolf Rizman said is true: "There are few rewards, if any, for those policy makers who really care for ethnic harmony."[103]

Crumbling Contrasts

Foreign powers have influenced the outcome of the political struggle in India and Bosnia in favor of the "ethnic" paradigm. This is remarkable and maybe dis-appointing. But it is even more striking that, in spite of this, the ethnonational front-lines have crumbled quite rapidly after acquiring their ultimate goal. Or is it *because* of this? Much more likely so. Two reasons can be presented that explain the weakness of the "ethnic" concept and the short breath of ethnonational movements: one is external and one is theoretically inherent to the concept itself.

First of all, since ethnonational cleavages were mentally duplicated and actively

promoted by external actors, no broad mass movement was necessary in order to reach the final goal of an ethnonational state. The many existing problems did not kill the project even though there were the discrepancies between the action group and the members of the promoted "ethnic group," cross-cutting primordial factors and cleavages within the alleged "ethnic group" (ethnic factors versus the "ethnic" concept), and the discord among the ethnonational spokespeople themselves.[104] Instead, the concept worked very well by tapping external resources.

Huntington agrees, arguing that Pakistan received its statehood "too easily." Jinnah's Muslim League could not create any mass appeal and had only a thin social basis. Hence, Hungtington states, "In post-independence Pakistan the [Muslim] League lost both its constituency and its purposes."[105]

The Muslims in Bosnia have not formed a broad national movement either and, still, almost ended up in their own state—simply because the structure around them fell into pieces. One could call this "negative nation building."

Muslims in Bosnia, even after the war, have shown the strongest inclination of all "ethnic groups" to nurture the idea of a multi-"ethnic" state. They have also displayed a variety of dogmatic and political approaches and are far from homogeneous. This can be explained by the rather slow process of Muslim nation building throughout history. Given this, the opportunity for ethnonational statehood emerged too quickly and suddenly.

The second reason is connected to the idea of "ethnicity" itself. This action concept is ideologically weak and has nothing to offer except a notion of "ethnic" homogeneity, ethnonational competition or hatred, and the promise of one's "own" state with political resources granted on the international platform. Emancipative ideas of societal or economic progress hardly exist. It was no coincidence that the party programs of the ethnonational parties for the Bosnian elections in 1990 were much shorter than those of the other parties. In India, the Muslim League soon established almost the same program as the Congress Party. The only difference was the call for "Pakistan."

The advantage of "ethnic" action concepts is that they have a temporal lead when it comes to mobilizing support. They do not need any discussion; instead they directly dock at primordial elements that appear ready and clear. These concepts, however, turn out to be of use in a dynamic process only, i.e., on the way toward the ultimate goal of an ethnonational state. Once this goal is reached, the ethnonational cleavage loses its meaning and purpose because large parts of the hostile ethnonational camps are now fenced in by state borders. The "homogenized" interior does not remain peaceful for long. Other cleavages will emerge in the business of everyday politics.

This phenomenon can be ideally observed in Pakistan. After partition, the ethnicentre of religion crumbled and was replaced by the ethnicentre of language. New contrasts gained importance and influenced political outcomes. Intrareligious cleavages have sharpened as well. Fights between Sunnis and the minority Shias

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have become increasingly frequent. This was primarily caused by a campaign of Islamization, accompanied by an Urdu campaign since the 1980s which has removed English as the official language. Riaz Hassan argues that "To the extent the Islamization process disregards regional, lingusitic and primordial ties it only succeeds in heightening the national sentiments of a number of nationalities which constitute Pakistan."[106] Regional movements for Baluchistani, Sindhi, or Pakhtani autonomy have gained momentum. In addition, the former Muslim immigrants from India (Mohajirs) who arrived after the partition have established themselves as an ethnic group in Karachi. All these factors contradict the "ethnic" concept of the homogeneous Muslim homeland of Pakistan.

To a certain extent, this tendency can be also observed in Serbia and the Serbian parts of Bosnia, where "ethnic" harmony is weak and political dissent strong, above all between Banja Luka and Pale. The case of the Bosnian Muslims has already been mentioned. The difference is, however, that here the discrepancy between claim and reality is not so great, since the goal of a Bosnian Muslim ethnonational state was neither fully clear nor strongly pursued. The recent election successes of multiethnic parties in Bosnia such as the Social Democrats underpin the assumption that new cleavages beyond the "ethnic" ones can gain momentum in the phase of consolidation.[107] This is a slow process, as the subsequent parliamentary election showed. However, it is enough to annoy ethnonationalist spokespeople, as happened with Izetbegovic when he explained the reasons for his resignation from the Bosnian presidency in 2000: "The Bosniac [Bosnian Muslim] people have not recovered their awareness to a sufficient degree. ... Then the Bosniac people split easily, they are keen to argue amongst themselves, which is also one of the causes of my disappointment."[108]

The observations made in these case studies lead to the conclusion that, in the end, there cannot be such things as ethnonational states (commonly called "nation states"). The "ethnic" cleavage becomes obsolete, or the "ethnic" concept will die with its own success as it succeeds in attaining its highest goal, the ethnonational state.

This is just the opposite of what Mill once recommended. He argued that before democracy enters, society must be homogenized and develop a "harmony of feeling."[109] If this were true, democracy and ethnonationally heterogeneous states could not exist together. However, almost all people in the world live in heterogeneous states and an increasing number of them are democracies.[110] Instead, we have seen that if states are founded or do exist with the presumption of being ethnonationally homogeneous, the democratic system furthers and helps display ethnonational heterogenization.

Breaking out of the Vicious Circle

Taking into consideration the findings of these case studies, political actors—

external ones and internal ones anyway—should not give in to ethnonational demands, neither symbolically, nor politically, nor institutionally. If they do so, this will create a vicious circle in which every further step to solve conflicts, including the drawing of borders, will be ever more tightly bound to the "ethnic" paradigm, as happened in the cases of Yugoslavia and colonial India.

Donald Horowitz describes what this means for party systems: "Once ethnic politics begins in earnest, each party, recognizing that it cannot count on defections from members of the other ethnic group, has the incentive to solidify the support of its own group."[111] This has an escalating effect in sharpening political contrasts along ethnonational lines. Multi- and trans-"ethnic" parties will be ground between the millstones. The unbridgeable and exclusive friend–foe scheme of Carl Schmitt[112] will be projected onto the ethnonational camps. Political constituencies will become unmovable. The state will be paralyzed.

It is doubtful if and when the ex-Yugoslav states can break out of this vicious circle. Still, there have been some encouraging signs. The overthrow of the ethno-nationalist Milosevic regime by the united opposition and many ordinary people in the streets of Belgrade in October 2000 is one example. Another is the death of Franjo Tudjman, the decay of hardliners of the Croatian nationalist party HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)) in Croatia and their turbulences in the Hercegovina, and the election victory of non-ethnonational forces in Croatia at the beginning of 2000. The moderate government in the Serb entity of Bosnia-Hercegovina had raised some hopes earlier. In Bosnia, the latest losses, though moderate, of ethnonational parties also send positive signals. It is doubtful whether India, which still claims to be a secular state, can prevent itself sliding into an ethnonational mess as well. The rise of the Hindu ethnonationalists from the margin of society to governmental power has solidified the positions of the ethno-national camps. However, unlike in Bosnia-Hercegovina during and after the war, there are still reasonably strong political alternatives such as the Congress Party.

The rise of similar alternatives in the Balkans depends largely on two dialectic factors.

First of all, the external actors, who once—willingly or unwillingly—provided ethnonationalists with incentives, are now turning to supporting multi- and trans-"ethnic" forces. In the 2000 elections the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) clearly took a substantial stand and encouraged the Bosnians to "vote for change". Economic progress and new foreign policy perspectives can promote new policy issues and divisions beyond the ethnonational question—which leads us to the second point.

Non-ethnonational governments will benefit from a clear perspective of inter-national partnership. The domestic political climate of Slovenia and Croatia has profited from the mere existence of the issue of possible integration into the European Union. Although this is a long-term perspective it is already helping to steer debate away from the single and parochial issue of ethnonationalism.

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When ethnonational politics exists in an advanced stage, solutions are hard or impossible to find within the "nation state" itself, despite varying institutional approaches.[113] The reason is simple. It is just the state level to which ethnonationalists have directed their projections and claims. The state level is the very bone of contention. For, in the traditional view and in international law, the state is the only guarantor of respect and of political and economic resources. Therefore, in order to expel the hot air, it makes sense to move away from this level and to open up another dimension.

The strongest alternative at present is the European Union (EU). In the more advanced stage of European integration only five years after the war in Bosnia, it has become much less likely that the member states will repeat their mistakes and pursue conflicting national foreign policies toward warring parties. Moreover, joining EU supra-state structures has become mentally, politically, and economically more and more rewarding for Balkan states.

A quite ambiguous protagonist of the Bosnian war recognized this option a long time ago. In the late 1960s, Alija Izetbegovic made a statement that today only few people would attribute to him:

> The creation of the European Economic Community—although this claim may seem unacceptable at first sight—constitutes the most constructive event in 20th century European history. And the establishment of this supranational structure was the first real victory of the European peoples over nationalism. Nationalism has become a luxury, a thing too expensive for small and even for medium-sized nations.[114]

This illustrates that one will not find common ground for ethnonationalists and promoters of civic-democratic societies on issues related to the substate level, like primordialism and the existence and importance of "ethnic groups;" nor on the state level, where the fight for resources is a zero-sum game. It is possible, however, to get them together on the issue of supra-state structures. It is no coincidence that regionalists—the distinction between them and ethnonationalists is often fluid—in Italy, Spain, and Northern Ireland are often enthusiastic spokespeople for European integration. One could presume that the South Asian landscape would look different if only the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) would wake up from its paralysis and develop supra-state structures.

This does not mean that this type of solution would constitute a cure-all against ethnonational conflicts or "ethnic" constructions. However, it would certainly be valuable to create a variety of policy issues that would help prevent political debates narrowing down to this sort of ideological simplicity, which often carries fatal consequences.

It is important to create new worlds of experience, since everything is a purely intellectual issue though ethnonational spokespeople claim—and too many people believe them—that "ethnicity" has something to do with true origin. As a last resort of argumentation one can turn to anthropology. Excavations of skulls and bones in

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the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent do not confirm the "ethnic" cleavage at all.[115] What matters is not what people are, but what they think. Worlds of experience shape people's minds and can even take the place of primordial factors. Terror, war, and rape have convinced many that "ethnic groups" cannot live together even though it has been exposed that this terror is based on the strategy of a relatively few brutal activists only.[116]

International efforts in the Balkans which apply lessons learned from past mistakes, secular governments in India, and new foreign-policy and supra-state perspectives could bring about new worlds of experience, which may gradually influence views and political outcomes. This scenario, however, will need a long time to succeed.

Conclusion

What happened in Bosnia and colonial India was the result of a big mistake. The error started to take hold in theory and later in practice. Internal and external actors fell prey to, or actively promoted, the notion that, first, clear-cut ethnic groups exist and, second, they are politically incompatible. Primordially speaking, this was nonsense because ethnic features are spread diffusely and do not coincide with the proclaimed groups. Also, politically, the cleavages were not that clear cut at all. Ethnic conflict did not exist. Instead, ethnic cleavages in the primordial sense (and political cleavages) ran counter to the "ethnic" concepts presented by cultural and political spokesmen who argued that Serbs, Croats, Hindus, and Muslims were indeed ethnic groups. To make their arguments more convincing, these spokesmen searched for additional contrasts to the people's beliefs, which they found in alledgedly primordial features (language, customs, etc.) as well as in distorted historiography.

Thus when conflicting parties speak of "ethnic conflict," alarm bells should ring among journalists and politicians. This has not been the case in the past. Instead, journalists and politicians adopted these ideas without scrutiny, which led to reporting and policy outcomes that were located within the "ethnic" paradigm.

"Ethnicity," as observed in Bosnia and colonial India, is not a historic phenomenon, but a concentric concept of action with religion as ethnicentre. It is the ideological basis for ethnonationalism/communalism with political dynamics and claims. It stands aloof of ethnicity in the primordial sense, though no alternative terminology has emerged, primarily because ethnonationalists use this concept and refer to primordial arguments in a highly selective way. However, their concept and their strategy must be undressed in order to strip them of ideological and political resources. This is even more necessary because ethnonationalists easily conquer the political stage in times of societal transition and political vacuum. They sell a very simple concept, which falls back on actually or allegedly existing features ("selective primordialism") that are not suited to political debate. Hence, they enjoy a

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temporal advantage over pluralist and democratic forces, whose arguments need people's attention and a political platform for discussion.

There is also a practical reason why avoiding ethnonational outcomes makes sense. The final goal of ethnonationalists—the ethnonational state ("nation state")—does not solve any problems in the long run. State politics is too complicated to be reduced to an "ethnic" cleavage. New antagonisms will quickly emerge within one group when it no longer has to deal with the "others" in the same society. In addition, refugee problems, disputed territories, and armament are likely to heat up the old conflict between two proclaimed ethnonational states with new issues and new means.

The readiness to grant sovereignty to proclaimed ethnonations is not only an outcome of practical events (like the collapse of communism, German unification, etc.) but also grounded in the ideas of history and international law. There are two more conceptual mistakes that when combined create turbulences. The first is that "nation" in post-Cold-War Europe and at the end of colonialism is mostly understood in the "ethnic" rather than the political-democratic sense. The French Revolution did not leave any enduring ideals in this sense. Secondly, "nation" is all too often equated with "state" (as in the United Nations, where states, not nations, are members). Confusing the (ethno)nation with the state on the international level inevitably provides ethnonational spokespeople with arguments in their striving for sovereignty as an end in itself.

A solution to dampen the conflict both within a (still) existing state structure and in the stage of two states already divided by ethnonationalism is adding a new dimension to the political scene, namely, supra-state perspectives. Often, the state itself cannot provide a solution, in spite of a variety of institutional power-sharing arrangements, already proposed and partly tried. This is because it is the state level itself that is contested in the struggle for sovereignty. This struggle is a zero-sum-game for the ethnonational actors. Interestingly, many ethnonationalists in Europe can unite around the idea of European supra-state structures. Apart from economic benefits, there is another more important reason for the attractiveness of such structures: this exit option defuses the normatively overloaded notion of sovereignty as it has developed since the nineteenth century.

These case studies of Bosnia and India lead to the following conclusion, which awaits testing in other areas: *ethnic groups are not politically incompatible but are incompatible with politics.* If this insight descends from the sphere of academics to Western policy advisers and politicians it could give them a better grip on conflict resolution in modern times. Supranationality, devaluation of political sovereignty, conceptual separation of nation and state, and the consequent denial of ethnic conflict could open new doors in international politics at the beginning of the new millennium.

NOTES

* The article is based on a presentation for the conference "Democracy and Human Rights in Multi-ethnic Societies" in Konjic (Bosnia-Hercegovina) in July 2000. These thoughts are elaborated in: Carsten Wieland, *Nationalstaat wider Willen: Die Politisierung von Ethnien und die Ethnisierung der Politik, Bosnien, Indien, Pakistan* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2000). An English edition is being prepared.

1. James Manor, "'Ethnicity' and Politics in India," *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, 1996, pp. 460–461.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 465.

3. Holm Sundhausen, *Experiment Jugoslawien: Von der Staatsgründung bis zum Staatszerfall* (Mannheim: B. I. Taschenbuchverlag, 1993), p. 12.

4. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1921), p. 242.

5. Representatives of the primordial approach include Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Burkhard Ganzer, "Zur Bestimmung des Begriffs der ethnischen Gruppe," *Sociologus*, Vol. 40, 1990, pp. 3–18; Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860–1923* (London: Oxford University Press, 1993).

6. Representatives of this approach are, for example: Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press 1985); Paul R. Brass, ed., *Riots and Pogroms* (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Anthony P. Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (London: Tavistock, 1985); J. Y. Okamura, "Situational Ethnicity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 4, 1981, pp. 452–465; Michael Banton, "Rational Choice Theories," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 38, 1995, pp. 478–497; Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford Univesity Press, 1992); Albert F. Reiterer, "Die politische Konstitution von Ethnizität," in Gerhard Seewann, ed., *Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992); Romila Thapar, "The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics," *Social Scientist*, Vol. 24, 1996, pp. 1–3; K. N. Panikkar, *Communal Threat and Challenge* (Madras: Earthworm Press, 1997); Wolfgang Kaschuba, "Identité, altérité et mythe ethnique," *Ethnologie française*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1997, pp. 499–515.

7. Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, pp. 119–120 and Manor "'Ethnicity' and Politics in India," pp. 459–460 in relation to India.

8. Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, p. 118.

9. Georg Elwert, "Nationalismus und Ethnizität: Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Vol. 41, 1989, pp. 440–464.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 38.

11. Mill speaks of "feeling of nationality." John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government, chap. XVI: Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative Government," in John Gray, ed., *On Liberty and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 [1861]), p. 427. Mill defines the term "nationality" with constructivist connotations. Weber spoke of an "'artificial' kind of belief in ethnic community." Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 237. On Weber and ethnicity, see John Stone, "Race, Ethnicity, and the Weberian Legacy," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 38,

1995, pp. 391–406.

12. Sabrina P. Ramet, "Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia's Muslims, Reconsidered," *South Slav Journal*, Vol. 13, 1990, p. 2 (emphasis added).

13. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991), p. 70.

14. The most eminent representative is Anthony Smith. See, for instance, Anthony Smith, ed., *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (New York: E. J. Brill, 1992); *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1996, pp. 445–458. In his later works, such as *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Brass drifts from an instrumentalist to a mixed approach. See also Sandra Freitag, *Collective Action and Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), who describes the Indian cow protection movements.

15. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, p. 75 (original emphasis).

16. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," pp. 445ff.

17. Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 34ff. points to the fact that Marxists and Liberals are subject to the same error: they have underestimated the force of ethnonationalism.

18. Like the primordialist Geertz, and the constructivists Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the Marxist approach, see Les Back and John Solomos, "Marxism, Racism and Ethnicity," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 38, 1995, pp. 407–420. For an overview of the discussion, see Ramet, "Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism."

19. Kohn is the most eminent scholar to defend this thesis. See also Elwert "Nationalismus und Ethnizität: Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen;" Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn (London: Verso, 1991); Friedrich Heckmann, "Ethnische Vorurteile," in ibid., ed., *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation: Soziologie interethnischer Beziehungen* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1992); Albert F. Reiterer, "Die politische Konstitution von Ethnizität," in Seewann, *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation*; Habermas, "Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat." Some of the debates are illustrated well by Pedro Ramet, who refers to the Yugoslavian example. See Ramet, "Die Muslime Bosniens als Nation," in Georg Brunner, Andreas Kappeler, and Gerhardt Simon, eds, *Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in jugoslawien: Identität, Politik* (Cologne: Markus, 1989); Deutsch in *Nationalism and Social Communication* also contributes to this approach with his theory of social communication.

20. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 130–132. He does make clear that he does *not* defend the view of an "awakening" of nations but the constructivist approach of a new form of social organization. However, he starts from primordial elements (language, literature) as independent variables that are used in the process of nation building. From this point of view he criticizes the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who, as Gellner says, defends a "bloodless" approach detached from any tradition. Gellner holds that with Kant's concept there could never be any nation building.

21. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," p. 447 (emphasis added).

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22. Dipankar Gupta, *The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in a Comparative Perspective* (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 6.

23. Norbert Reiter, *Gruppe, Sprache, Nation* (Berlin: Harrassowitz, 1984), p. 346.

24. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, p.18.

25. In rare cases it can also be more than one element. For example, in Sri Lanka religion and language mostly overlap with the groups of Sinhalese and Tamils. Both factors serve as primary contrasts. But this does not change the structure of "ethnicity" as described.

26. On the role of the churches and Balkan nationalisms, see Lenard Cohen, "Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997, pp. 481–499; Robin Okey, "State, Church and Nation in the Serbo-Croat speaking Lands of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1850–1914," in Donald A. Kerr, ed., *Religion, State and Ethnic Groups* (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1992); Drago Ocvirk, "Les religions dans les relations interéthniques: Le cas Yougoslave," in Silvo Devetak, Sergej Flere, and Gerhard Seewann, eds, *Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993).

27. For definitions of "community" and "communalism" see Romila Tapar, *Interpreting Early India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 61; Bipan Chandra, *Communalism in Modern India* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1987), pp. 1ff; Engineer, "India at Fifty: Fault Lines in Two-Nation Theory," p. 6; Prahba Dixit, *Communalism: A Struggle for Power* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1974), p. 1; K. N. Panikkar, *Communal Threat*, p. 67.

28. Quoted from Klaus von Beyme, *Systemwechsel in Osteuropa* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), p. 127.

29. John V. Fine, "The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society," in Mark Pinson, ed., *The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 11ff; Hans-Michael Miedlig, "Zur Frage der Identität der Muslime in Bosnien-Herzegowina," in Günter Scholl, ed., *Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Fremde Wege—Eigene Wege (Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte)* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 26ff; Wolfgang Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime," in Brunner, Kappeler, and Simon, eds, *Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien*, pp. 181ff. For more information on the Bogumil church, see Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 27ff; Srecko M. Dzaja, *Die "Bosnische Kirche" und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1978); *Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina: Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463–1804* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984); Smail Balic, *Das unbekannte Bosnien: Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1992), pp. 90ff.

30. Höpken, "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime," p. 182. See also Atif Puritava, "On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina," in Dusan Blagojevic, ed., *Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: 1974), p. 307.

31. Purivata, "On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina," p. 307.

32. See also Zachary T. Irwin, "The Islamic Revival and the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1984, p. 445.

33. Purivata, "On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina," p. 317.

34. Dzaja, Die *"Bosnische Kirche" und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*; Henrik Birnbaum, "The Ethno-linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina," *Die Welt der Slaven*, Vol. 32, 1987, pp. 1–24; Raju Thomas, "History, Religion and National Identity," in Richard H. Friman and Raju Thomas, eds, *The South Slav Conflict: History, Ethnicity, and Nationalism* (New York: Garland, 1996); Malcolm, *Kosovo*.

35. Dzaja, *Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina*, pp. 28–29.

36. Dzaja, *Die "Bosnische Kirche" und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, p. 69. He falls back on findings of V. Cubrilovic from 1935 (from sources from the fifteenth century), which have proven plausible today.

37. The Bosnian scholar Nedim Filipovic paid attention to this first. See Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 52; Dzaja, *Die "Bosnische Kirche" und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, pp. 72ff; Balic, *Das unbekannte Bosnien*, pp. 90ff. Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 309, points to a census from 1520 to 1530. According to this only 19% of the population in the Balkans were Muslims at that time. In Bosnia-Hercegovina the figure was 45%. Almost everywhere Muslims lived in the urban areas.

38. Purivata, interview with the author in Sarajevo, 27 June 2000. He stated that in the 1960s he only had available findings from the Yugoslav author Aleksandar Soloviev.

39. For more information, see Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 27ff.

40. Dzaja, "Bosnien-Herzegowina," in Michael Weithmann, ed., *Der ruhelose Balkan* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), p. 152.

41. Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 28–29; S. Ramet, "Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism," p. 5.

42. See V. D. Savarkar, *Hindutva: Who Is Hindu?* (Dehli: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969 [1922]); Madhar S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Bombay: Bahrat, 1938).

43. Romila Thapar, *The Past and Prejudice* (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1975), p. 6; "The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics," *Social Scientist*, Vol. 24, Nos 1–3, 1996, p. 24; Satish Chandra, *Historiography, Religion and the State in Medieval India* (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1996), p. 33; A. K. Biswas, "The Aryan Myth," in A. Ray and S. Mukherjee, eds, *Historical Archaeology of India* (New Delhi: Books & Books, 1990). Interestingly, these authors argue with the help of archeological data. Linguists, by contrast, still favor the migration theory. The arguments of the different camps can be found in George Erdosy, ed., *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia: Language, Material Culture and Ethnicity* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997).

44. Shrikant G. Talageri, *Aryan Invasion Theory and Indian Nationalism* (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 1993).

45. An entertaining survey can be found in Ayesha Jalal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1995 pp. 78ff.

46. Jinnah in a speech at the University of Aligarh, 10 March 1941. Asha Kaushik and Surenda N. Kaushik, "Religion as Political Ideology: The Separatist Crusade of Jinnah," in Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, eds, *Pakistan: Fifty Years of Independence. Vol. I: Towards Independence: The Pre-1947 Period* (New Delhi: Deep and Deep, 1997), p. 44.

47. "Aiming Missiles," *The Economist*, 9 May 1998.

48. See Gabriele Venzky, "Atomares Wettrennen der Erzfeinde," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 19 May 1998.

49. Romila Thapar, *Interpreting Early India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140.

50. Panikkar, *Communal Threat*, p. 73.

51. M. S. Gore, "Unity in Diversity," *Social Scientist*, Vol. 24, Nos 1–3, 1996, p. 43.

52. The concepts of *Ausbausprachen* and *Abstandsprachen* can be found in Radoslav Katicic, "Serbokroatische Sprache—Serbisch-kroatischer Sprachenstreit," in Reinhard Lauer and Werner Lehfeld, eds, *Das jugoslawische Desaster: Historische, sprachliche und ideologische Hintergründe* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), p. 24.

53. For more on Herder's reception in the Balkans, see Sundhaussen, *Der Einfluß der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburger Monarchie* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1973); Wolf D. Behschnitt, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten, 1830–1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1980), p. 66; Reiter, *Gruppe, Sprache, Nation*, pp. 283, 386ff. On Herder's reception in India, see Vrajendra R. Mehta, *Foundations of Indian Political Thought* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp. 158ff, 187ff; Angadipuram Appadorai, *Indian Political Thinking through the Ages* (New Delhi: Khama, 1992), pp. 219ff.

54. For more on Vuk Karadzic, see Reinhard Lauer, *Vuk Karadzic und seine Zeit* (Göttingen: 1987).

55. On the intra-Serbian differences of language, see Birnbaum, "The Ethno-Linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina," p. 2.

56. On the escalating language struggle after the collapse of Yugoslavia, see Raju Thomas, "History, Religion and National Identity," in Thomas and Friman, eds, *The South Slav Conflict*, p. 36. For Turkish elements in the Bosnian Muslim language, see David A. Dyker, "The Ethnic Muslims of Bosnia: Some Basic Socio-Economic Data," *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 50, April 1972, p. 243; Birnbaum "The Ethno-Linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina," p. 18; Ludwig Steindorff, "Von der Konfession zur Nation: Die Muslime in Bosnien-Herze-gowina," *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen*, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1997, p. 288

57. Christopher Shackle and Rupert Snell, eds, *Hindi and Urdu since 1800: A Common Reader* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1990); Hans R. Dua, "Hindi-Urdu as a Pluricentric Language," in Michael Clyne, ed., *Pluricentric Languages: Differing Norms in Different Nations* (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992); Jyotindra Das Gupta, *Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*.

58. See K. N. Panikkar, *Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectuals and Social Consciousness in Colonial India* (New Delhi: Tulika, 1995), p. 128; Vasudah Dalmia, *The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harischandra and Ninteenth-Century Benares* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 150. These findings underpin the arguments of Benedict Anderson.

59. Refer to the language conflict in the United Provinces as described in Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, p. 130ff.

60. Lakhi, "Language and Regionalism in Pakistan," p. 191.

61. Except for the forced missionizing of young boys in Bosnia under Ottoman rule.

62. Hamid Algar, "The Hamzeviye: A Deviant Movement in Bosnian Sufism," *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 36, Nos 2–3, p. 243, states that syncretisms did not occur in Bosnia. Steindorff observes the opposite in "Von der Konfession zur Nation: Die Muslime in

Bosnien-Herze-gowina," p. 288. Steindorff's definition of syncretisms is very wide and suggests that he really means benevolent acceptance of other people's religious customs.

63. For more about sycretisms in India, see Yogendra Singh, *Modernization of Indian Tradition: A Systematic Study of Social Change* (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1996), pp. 79–80; Dixit, *Communalism*, pp. 5, 20; Mushirul Hasan, *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since Independence* (London: Hurst, 1997).

64. Dominique-Sila Khan, *Conversions and Shifting Identities: Ramdev Pir and the Ismails in Rajasthan* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997).

65. Aydin Babuna, *Die nationale Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der österreichisch-ungarischen Periode* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1996), pp. 105ff; see also Dzaja, *Bosnien-Herzegowina in der österreichisch-ungarischen Epoche (1878–1918)*, p. 61; Pinson, "The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878–1918," pp. 99ff.

66. See Charles H. Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); also Panikkar, "Rationalism in the Religious Thought of Ram Mohan Roy," in *Indian History Congress Proceedings*, 1973; for an introduction to Ram Mohan Roy and his ideas, see Gavin Flood, *An Introduction to Hinduism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 251ff. On the homogenization of Hindudom, see Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925–1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For more about the cow protection movements, see Anand Yang, "Sacred Symbol and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in the 'Anti-Cow Killing' Riot of 1893," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 576–596; Freitag , "Sacred Symbol as Mobilizing Ideology: The North Indian Search for a 'Hindu Community,'" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 597–625; Peter van der Veer, "Riots and Rituals: The Construction of Violence and Public Space in Hindu Nationalism," in: Brass, *Riots and Pogroms, London.*

67. On the Khilafat movement, see Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); B. R. Nanda, *Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 104ff.

68. Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*, p. 14.

69. Strategies and examples can be found in Thomas, "History, Religion and National Identity," pp. 135–136; Marie-Janine Calic, *Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina: Ursachen, Konfliktstrukturen, Internationale Lösungsversuche* (Frankfurt: Shurkamp, 1996), pp. 92ff; Mirjana Morokvasic, "Krieg, Flucht und Vertreibung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien," *Demographie aktuell*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1993, p. 13; Laura Silber and Alan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 269ff; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 216–217; Kursheed K. Aziz, ed., *Muslims under Congress Rule 1937–39: A Documentary Record*, 2 vols (Delhi: Renaissance, 1986), pp. 349ff; Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, p. 226.

70. Examples in Carsten Wieland, *Nationalstaat wider Willen: Die Politisierung von Ethnien und die Ethnisierung der Politik, Bosnien, Indien, Pakistan* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2000), pp. 299ff

71. Press release, Washington, 10 February 1993, in *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 7, 1993, pp. D158–D161.

72. Report (session 1933–1934), in Aziz, *Muslims under Congress Rule 1937–39*, Vol. 1, 1986, p. 13.

73. See Marie-Janine Calic and Volker Perthes, "Krieg und Konfliktlösung in Bosnien und Libanon: Ein Strukturvergleich," *Politik und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1995, pp. 144ff. They compare the situation with Libanon. See also the systematic approach of Laslo Sekelj in *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Vladimir Goati, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: The Role of Political Elites," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997.

74. Sekelj, *Yugoslavia*, p. xxiii (original emphasis).

75. More than half of the Bosnian Serbs emigrated or lived together with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the territory controlled by the government of Alija Izetbegovic (often rashly referred to as the "Muslim government"). See Wieland, "Die aktuellen Konfliktlinien in Bosnien-Herzegowina," *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, pp. 188–198.

76. Seijfudin Tokic, "Ethnische Ideologie und Eroberungskrieg: Zur Kritik der Aufteilung Bosnien-Herzegowinas," in Nenad Stefanov and Michael Werz, eds, *Bosnien und Europa: Die Ethnisierung der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994), pp. 175–176, 179.

77. Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, p. 252.

78. For more details see Wieland, *Nationalstaat wider Willen*, pp. 299ff. On the Bosnian case, see Sekelj, *Yugoslavia*; Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 56ff; Calic, *Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina*; Viktor Meier, *Wie Jugoslawien verspielt wurde* (Munich: Beck, 1995). On the Indian elections see Anita Inder Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936–1947* (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press: 1987); Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India 1885–1947* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983), p. 427; Sho Kuwajima, *Muslims, Nationalism and the Partition: 1946 Provincial Elections in India* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1998); Akbahr Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London: Routledge, 1997); Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

79. Sekelj, *Yugoslavia*, pp. 17–18.

80. The final verdict is not spoken yet on how much the West influenced the outcomes in Yugoslavia. But even authors who place more guilt on the local elites (like Burg and Shoup) concede that the West missed many opportunities.

81. Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 92ff; Radan, "The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia," pp. 537ff; Julia Goette, "Von Den Haag bis Dayton: Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft auf der Suche nach einer Lösung des dritten Balkankrieges (1991–1996)," in Elvert, ed., *Der Balkan*, p. 231; Alain Pellet, "The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples," *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1992; Miedlig (1992), in *Südosteuropa*, 1992, p. 120.

82. Johannes Vollmer, "Dayton—eine Pax Americana," *Europäische Rundschau*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1996, p. 9.

83. Stefan Troebst, "Balkanisches Politikmuster?, Nationalrevolutionäre Bewegungen in Südosteuropa und die "Ressource Weltöffentlichkeit," *Osteuropa*, Vol. 50, No. 11, 2000, pp. 1254ff.

84. "UN-Vermittler: Kroaten und Bosnier sind Serben," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 28 June 1995.

85. Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, p. 110

86. Descriptions and corresponding assessments of the international interventions may be found in, among others, Calic, *Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina*.

87. Radha Kumar, "Bosnia in the Annals of Partition: From Divide and Rule to Divide and

Quit," in Mushirul Hasan, ed., *Islam, Communities and the Nation: Muslim Identities in South Asia and Beyond* (Delhi: Manohar, 1998), pp. 426.

88. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman.*

89. Bosnian lawyer Anis Bajrektarevic, interview with the author, 26 March 1998.

90. In both cases a Muslim "nation state" was proclaimed (Pakistan) or came close to existence (Bosnia) although many Muslims did not support this idea. In Bosnia, Izetbegovic and his colleagues in the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA) (Party of Democratic Action) were at least ambiguous about this concept. See Wieland, *Nationalstaat wider Willen.*

91. Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

92. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Boston: Becaon, 1960), p. 92.

93. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 528 (original emphasis).

94. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 5.

95. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 7 (original emphasis).

96. See also James Mayall and Mark Simpson, "Ethnicity Is Not Enough: Reflections on Protracted Secessionsism in the Third World," in Smith, ed., *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, p. 8.

97. Hobsbawm, "Die neuen Nationalismen," *Die Zeit*, 6 May 1999.

98. Robert Mickey and Adam Albion Smith, "Resolving Ethnic Conflict: A Rethorical Intervention," in Devetak, Flere, and Seewann, eds, *Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas*, p. 63.

99. Mayall and Simpson, "Ethnicity Is Not Enough" pp. 7–8.

100. Louis Henkin, "The Mythology of Sovereignty," in R. S. Macdonald, ed., *Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994). On the deconstruction of sovereignty in international law, see the arguments of Joseph Camilleri. Camilleri, "Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World," in Saul H. Mendlovitz and R. B. J. Walker, eds, *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community* (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1990). Otto Kimminich, *Einführung in das Völkerrecht*, 6th edn (Tübingen: Francke, 1997), pp. 90ff. Already Sieyès had warned of an overvaluation of the term "sovereignty;" see Adolf Dock, *Revolution und Restauration über die Suveränität* (Aalen: Sciencia, 1972 [1900]).

101. On the internal right of self-determination, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, *Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Minderheitenrechte im Völkerrecht: Herausforderun-gen an den globalen und regionalen Menschenrechtsschutz* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), pp. 84ff, 153ff.

102. James B. Steinberg, "International Involvement in the Yugoslav Conflict," in Lori F. Damrosch, ed., *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 57.

103. Rizman, "The Sociological Dimension of Conflicts between Ethnonationalisms," p. 305.

104. Above all, in the Balkans in the first half of the twentieth century, it used to be common that even representatives of ethnonational parties, mostly of "Muslim" parties, described themselves "ethnically" as Serb or Croatian. All different combinations were possible. Examples are in S. Ramet "Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia's Muslims, Reconsidered," p. 10.

105. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 442.

106. Riaz Hassan, "Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1985, p. 280.

107. In the municipal elections in April 2000 the Social Democrats trippled their share of the vote to 30% from 1997, whereas Izetbegovic's SDA suffered losses, especially in big cities like Sarajevo (data from the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo).

108. Interview with Alija Izetbegovic in the Bosnian TV station TV-BH, 6 June 2000.

109. Mill, "On Liberty and Other Essays," p. 434.

110. This contradiction is mentioned in Mayall and Simpson, "Ethnicity Is Not Enough," p. 6; Rizman, "The Sociological Dimension of Conflicts between Ethnonationalisms," p. 304.

111. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 318.

112. Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker und Homboldt, 1991 [1932]).

113. For example, Lijphart's consociational model. See Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New York: Yale University Press, 1984); and Horowitz's recommendation of the Westminister majority system as mentioned in Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. On these debates see also: Theodor Hanf and Sammy Smooha, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies," in Smith, ed., *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, pp. 31–32; Heckmann, *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation*, pp. 211–214; Vojislav Stanovcic, "Problems and Options in Institutionalizing Ethnic Relations," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1992, pp. 364–368.

114. Alija Izetbegovic, *The Islamic Declaration, o.O. 1970* (Sarajevo: Islamska deklaracija, 1990), p. 53.

115. For the Balkans, see Zivko M. Mikic, "Die Ethnogenese der Slawen aus der Sicht der Anthropologie," in Wolfram Bernhard and Annelise Kandler-Palsson, *Ethnogenese europäischer Völker* (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1986), p. 339; for the Indian subcontinent, see Kenneth A. R. Kennedy, "Have Aryans Been Identified in the Prehistoric Skeletal Record from South Asia?: Biological Anthropology and Concepts of Ancient Races," in Erdosy, ed., *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, pp. 60–61.

116. The strategy of rowdies, rapers, and killers were very similar during the Bosnian war and the time of partition in India. For examples on Bosnia, see Thomas, "History, Religion and National Identity," pp. 135–136; Calic, *Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina*, pp. 92ff; Morokvasic, "Krieg, Flucht und Vertreibung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien," p. 13; Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, pp. 269ff; Malcolm, *Bosnia*, pp. 216–217; and on India, see Aziz, *Muslims under Congress Rule 1937–39* (Vol I), pp. 349ff; Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, p. 226, Systematic Approaches: Engineer, "India at Fifty;" Brass, *Riots and Pogroms*.